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In public policy, as with any academic field, theories are proffered in defense of scholarly ideas. But unlike academia, sociopolitical feasibility constrains the bargaining power of legislators and politicians and dictates the ultimate success or failure of their policy prescriptions. While ideal theory lends credence to the proposals drafted by policy writers, and leads governments down a path towards an enlightened future, much of the impact of these philosophies becomes confounded by the political reality of the world in which we live. Undoubtedly, purely academic work has its merits, but in order for suggested reforms to survive legislative and judicial scrutiny in the U.S., they must be properly grounded in political, social, and economic fact. There does not exist a single, unifying theory for immigration policy or international migration. Lack of a distinct philosophical foundation, however, does not make the all-too-often arbitrary and uninformed assertions of partisan politicians any more reasonable or correct.

What follows is an attempt to apply a Rawlsian conception of morality to the realm of international relations and immigration policy.⁵⁴ Afterward, theories concerning the macroeconomic and distributive effects of immigration on receiving countries are discussed, and the link between economic development and international migration is explained. Some critics will be quick to note that in a world where the primacy of the self-determining state is virtually uncontested, the U.S., similar to any other country, has every right to assert whatever policy it sees fit. Issues of social justice and fairness are no less applicable to the realm of transnational migration than they are to domestic politics. If they were (less pertinent), then as a logical following, the peoples of nations other than one’s own would necessarily be of lesser moral status. There is something extremely perverse in this notion, to such a degree it ought to be considered blatant prejudice. A state may or may not be entitled to unfettered control over its own immigration laws, but if it creates unfair guidelines that marginalize the interests of international actors, all of its people are culpable for the contravention of justice.

An Interest-Based Approach to Immigration Policy

Rawls’ original position of equality is a vehicle for thought experimentation that provides a particularly helpful perspective from which to view many moral questions. Corresponding to the state of nature in social contract theory, the original position is not a historical state of affairs but “a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice.”⁵⁵ Included in this notion is that no one knows his social status, location of birth, natural assets or the like; all principles of justice are chosen behind this “veil of ignorance.”⁵⁶ In this manner, situational bias is removed from the process of decision-making (or in this case policy creation), allowing rules of conduct, whether they govern domestic or international actors, to be formulated in a setting that is fundamentally fair and equal.⁵⁷

Now, before applying this view to the realm of transnational migration, it is important that some initial social and political conditions are outlined; otherwise, it would seem that any conclusions that were reached would be so far outside the bounds of reality as to be practically unworkable at any point in the future. In this vein, since the limits of practicable political possibility are framed within existing social and political conditions, the state of the world reflects what Rawls calls a “realistic utopia.”⁵⁸ For our realistic utopia, let us assume that international society consists of a system of states joined together by already existing international institutions and law. While a more nuanced approach to an investigation of the purely moral constraints upon states’ immigration policies might best be served through a completely cosmopolitan viewpoint, such a discussion would seem to have limited applicability to the world today.

In applying these concepts to transnational migration and immigration policy, the purpose is not to develop one, coherent theory. Rather, the goal is to ensure that the interests of all relevant parties are adequately considered, and thus, whatever value system a particular policy implicitly supports is wholly logical and internally consistent, stemming from conditions that are inherently just. One of the main reasons that such a theory is advantageous to a debate over immigration policy is that it avoids the pitfalls of a domestic politics approach. “Domestic politics models (or ‘society-centered approaches’) assume that the state serves as a neutral arena for societal interests: interest groups and parties.”⁵⁹ Such models can be used to explain many of our nation’s past immigration laws, including the national origins quota system and the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. Given the relatively small percentage of the U.S. population represented by African-Americans, Jews, Asians and Mexicans during the first half of the twentieth century, according to a society-centered model, it should come as little surprise that domestic political processes resulted in immigration laws that greatly favored whites of Nordic ancestry. The original position is implemented with the express intention to counsel against the creation of such arbitrarily discriminatory and one-sided policies. Since immigration affects domestic citizens as well as transnational migrants from all countries, it would only seem appropriate that the interests of both groups be considered.

It is important to emphasize that this notion–the concept of an ‘equal consideration of all relevant interests’ (from behind a veil of ignorance)–is not being asserted in opposition to the communitarian tradition. According to Michael Walzer, one of the major proponents of communitarian theory, “[A]ffluent and free countries are, like elite universities, besieged by applicants. They have to decide on their own size and character.”⁶⁰ Communitarians view a state’s right to exclude anyone and everyone as absolute, rooted in the idea that this represents the only long-term manner to defend the coherence and identity of the group.⁶¹ The use of an original position for the purposes of evaluating interests beyond those of domestic citizens remains silent with regard to such theories. Even if states were assumed to have the right to adhere to any type of immigration policy, whether it entailed completely restrictive or completely porous borders, this would provide no indication of what a state ought to do.

In this light, countries, especially ones with relatively wealthy economies and robust natural resources, have what philosophers would call an “imperfect duty” to adopt reasonably liberal immigration policies.⁶² Although, given the current world order, a nation may not have an obligation to afford any foreigners the ability to settle within its sovereign territory, it ought to adhere to as liberal an immigration policy as possible, to such an extent that a country’s government and people are not excessively burdened. Certainly, exactly what would constitute an “excessive burden” is open to debate–specifically, an academic dialogue concerning the social and economic consequences of immigration upon the receiving country.⁶³ The difficulty associated with the pursuit of agreement upon what would amount to an “excessively burdensome” immigration policy, however, does not divest one bit of merit from the argument that views those policies as an imperfect duty of receiving countries.

Following from the original position, “one could not justify [immigration] restrictions on the grounds that those born in a given territory or born of parents who were citizens were more entitled to the benefits of citizenship than those born elsewhere or born of alien parents. Birthplace and parentage are natural contingencies that are ‘arbitrary from a moral point of view.’”⁶⁴ While moral considerations are not the only constraints placed upon the calculus of public policy, the primacy of global distributive justice should not be underestimated. This is not a utopian assertion that requires a radically new view of international politics. Global justice can be discussed within the confines of a nation-state system, and domestic security issues can still remain paramount in all countries. Nevertheless, in deference to the inability of a person to control the social circumstances that he or she is born into, and in recognition of their relatively fortunate position in the world, individuals in immigration receiving states ought to support reasonably liberal immigration policies, even if doing so carries with it certain inconveniences.

As derived from the original position, this view is, in certain respects, perfectly in line with global egalitarianism. Not only does it champion the moral equality of all human beings, but it views equality of opportunity, or global distributive justice, as the highest moral objective. On the other hand, it avoids what might be considered the “fatal flaw” of the global egalitarian ideology. As Myron Weiner notes, “Globalists [...] pay little attention to whether the adoption of their principles in a world comprised of sovereign states would lead to an improvement or worsening of the human condition in any specific country.”⁶⁵ For ideal theory to carry weight in today’s international domain, certain practical constraints must be accepted as given. Namely, national boundaries, regardless how arbitrarily determined, are not about to magically disappear, and federal governments will always give priority to the interests of their own citizens over those of foreigners. Although globalists peddle the notion of “open borders,” such a suggestion completely ignores the issue of sociopolitical feasibility. In contrast, use of the original position should cause policymakers to pause and consider the interests of others outside their nation, but it does not, given the current international order of self-determining states, impose any obligations upon individual countries.

In addition, the argument in favor of reasonably liberal immigration policies is further bolstered by the global distribution of natural resources. Charles Beitz has written extensively on the issue of resource allocation and global justice, commenting, “The appropriation of valuable resources by some will leave others comparatively, and perhaps fatally, disadvantaged. [...] [T]he natural distribution of resources is a purer case of something’s being ‘arbitrary from a moral point of view’ than the distribution of talents.”⁶⁶ The social circumstances of a given society are intricately linked to that political community’s natural resources. A nation that finds itself atop a gold mine is no more (morally) deserving of the resulting economic benefits than a child who happens to find a $100 bill floating in the wind. Those who suffer disadvantages from this type of “accident of birth” might well press claims to some form of remuneration.⁶⁷ In this respect, liberal immigration policies should be viewed less as the charity of a receiving country and more as the pursuit of global justice. After all, if economic prosperity existed domestically, a country’s citizens would have little incentive to migrate. Individuals often use transnational migration as a way to overcome the missing or failed markets that appear in the course of economic development.⁶⁸ Thus, to display gratitude for their fortunate natural resource allocation, immigration receiving nations ought to help mitigate the problems individuals experience as a result of a resource-handicapped economic development process. One way for wealthier countries to do this is through supporting and proliferating various liberal immigration regimes–policies which indirectly allow for the transfer of capital between peoples and nations.

Some may retort in statist fashion that countries are like corporations; similar to how the managers of a company have an obligation to their shareholders to maximize profits, one might argue that governments have a duty to their citizens to always seek to maximize the domestic common good. First, if this were unequivocally true, than it would be improper for the American government to spend any money on foreign aid. Governments like people should be commended for caring about the citizens of other countries. Carefully calculated charitable donations, short of being given in amounts that are injurious to the domestic economy or national security, represent human nature in its most perfect form. Secondly, failure to act with regard to the interests of those within a government’s sphere of influence embodies little more than the inability of public officials to grasp the import of “The Golden Rule.” In the words of Timothy King:

The argument for a global view is powerful. Other things being equal, the more people whose interests are considered, the more likely one is to arrive at a just solution. A global view maximizes the number of such people. Any smaller grouping, whether a single individual or nation, would run the risk of ignoring the interests of some significantly affected parties. If a global view is adopted, then considerations of liberty would normally reject restrictions on geographic mobility unless there were some very strong counterarguments.⁶⁹

Similar to foreign aid, liberal immigration policies should be seen as the confluence of charity and justice as fairness–“charity” in the sense that states are not obligated to accept any immigrants at all, but justice with respect to the ability of migration to redistribute wealth between peoples and nations. As humans, we value liberty, including the ability to roam freely, before all else. Prior to restricting freedom of movement, governments bear the ethical burden to establish some significantly higher cause.

Domestic Interests of Receiving Countries–The Economics of Immigration

The labor economist’s paradigmatic view of immigration’s macroeconomic and distributive effects on the domestic labor market has been explained by George Borjas.⁷⁰ According to this view, the host country’s production function is defined by two inputs, capital and labor. All workers, including immigrants and natives, are considered to be perfect substitutes, and initially, all capital is owned by natives.⁷¹ For the sake of simplicity, the supply of capital and labor, both foreign-born and native-born, are assumed to be perfectly inelastic.⁷² On the whole, the assumptions used by this basic model only serve to highlight the negative, distributive impact that immigration purportedly poses for native workers. Furthermore, the model is useful to demonstrate the anticipated effect of immigration upon the macroeconomic output of a host country. In comparing the simplistic labor economics theory to that of trade economics, the paradigmatic case of the former, which is presented below, is useful insofar as its anticipated macroeconomic and distributive implications are no different than those of the latter.

Consider figure 1, which illustrates the labor-market equilibrium for an immigration receiving nation both before and after the arrival of immigrants:

Source: Borjas, G. “The Economic Benefits from Immigration,” (1995), p. 7.

Since native labor (N) and immigrant labor (M) are perfectly substitutable, after immigration occurs, the total labor supply (L) is given by N + M. And because the supply of capital is perfectly inelastic, macroeconomic output is represented by the area below the marginal product of labor curve (MP_L). Prior to immigration, macroeconomic output corresponds to trapezoid ABN0. With the arrival of immigrants, however, labor market competition depresses domestic wages from W₀ to W₁, causing total output to expand, now becoming trapezoid ACL0. Given the inelastic capital supply, the comparative income effects on domestic workers and the owners of capital are readily apparent. Due to the wage reduction, native workers lose W₀BDW₁ from their aggregate salaries, and immigrants earn in total W₁M. While the owners of capital earned triangle ABW₀ before immigration, after immigration they receive triangle ACW₁. In addition, natives do realize the benefit of triangle BCD, what Borjas calls “the immigration surplus,” which represents the net increase in capital resulting from immigration. Although, absent any consideration of externalities, the American economy is left better off; still, major distributive effects accrue.⁷³ Specifically, consumers and the owners of capital pocket all of the nation’s macroeconomic gains from immigration and a share of native workers’ former salaries, represented above by the immigration surplus plus the net loss incurred by domestic workers, or graphically speaking, trapezoid W₀BCW₁.

For trade theorists, the results of their basic model are the same. In recent years Howard Chang has explained in detail how liberal immigration policies, similar to free trade in goods, work to a receiving nation’s macroeconomic benefit.⁷⁴ As Chang makes clear, for a country that possesses no market power in international markets, the same theory of comparative advantage that counsels against the emplacement of trade restrictions on goods governs the argument in favor of free trade in labor. When countries use tariffs and quotas to restrict trade on a certain good, prices will be low for that good in countries that can produce the good at low cost, but prices will be higher in countries that can produce the good only at higher cost. By removing trade barriers, all countries gain. Take the case of trade between country X and country Y. If country X produces a good at low cost, it will export the good to country Y, which can only produce the good at higher cost. In return, country X will receive a higher price for the good than it could obtain domestically. As for country Y, which can only produce the good at a higher cost than country X, it will import the good and its consumers will pay a lower cost than they would have paid if the good had been produced locally.⁷⁵

The theory of comparative advantage works the same for labor as it does for goods. Immigration restrictions allow inefficiencies of the domestic labor market to prevail, inhibiting the fruits of competition from coming to pass, including business developments and technological progress. Although migration controls protect the relatively high wages of some nationwide workers in specific industries, these costs are transferred to consumers, borne in the form of higher priced goods and services. The owners of the means of production as well as consumers forfeit gains that could be realized from the free trade of labor. Employers must search for their workforce within the narrow confines of national boundaries, even if they could reduce production costs by importing foreign labor. As a result, “[d]omestic workers are drawn from alternative activities that would be more valuable than the wage that would be paid to foreign workers.”⁷⁶

If restrictions were eliminated, increased labor market competition would allow inefficient firms the possibility to maintain or increase production at lower operating expenditures, unless sub-par business practices triggered their demise. Ultimately, average wages for some industries would reach a more competitive equilibrium, consumers would have lower priced goods and services, and workers would be properly allocated to domestic firms that possessed an international comparative advantage. Theoretically, even though the differences between protectionist labor policies and free trade are distributive, affecting the allocation of capital between workers, consumers, and the owners of the means of production, they also diverge on a macroeconomic level. Simply put, free trade increases the overall economic output of all countries involved.

With the paradigmatic economic models fleshed out, it is easy to see where, in the academic literature, the notion of immigrants “stealing American jobs” holds its origin. Both labor and trade economics predict that immigration will cause a redistribution of a nation’s financial pie, benefiting consumers and the owners of capital and hurting domestic workers. Irrespective of what theory may say, empirical works pertaining to immigration’s distributive effects on the labor market tell a different story. While Borjas may be a neo-liberal restrictionist who believes in the merit of labor economics’ distributional conclusions,⁷⁷ even he admits that economists have failed to find evidence for this assertion in their empirical studies. He remarks, “[T]he methodological arsenal of modern econometrics cannot detect a single shred of evidence that immigrants have a sizeable adverse impact on the earnings and employment opportunities of natives in the United States.”⁷⁸

In recent years, this statement has been bolstered by the work of Gaston and Nelson.⁷⁹ These researchers reviewed more than one-hundred empirical studies concerning the wage and unemployment effects of immigration, the vast majority from the last decade of the twentieth century. In summary, they argue “that the application of [labor and trade] models to the contemporary politics of immigration is based on a fundamental misreading of the facts of the situation and produces an analysis which is actively misleading. [...] [T]here is essentially no systematic evidence of large distributive effects of immigration.”⁸⁰ Surely contemporary restrictionists can assert economic theories in defense of their policy suggestions. They could also point to several empirical studies supporting the contention that immigrants “steal American jobs.” With a selective literature review, almost any argument concerning immigration’s impact on the labor market could be espoused. Nevertheless, Borjas’ statement rings true to this day–economists have yet to prove that immigration has any major adverse consequences on America’s native workers.⁸¹

Similar empirical inconclusiveness holds true for immigration’s impact upon the welfare state. Proponents of strong migration controls often claim that America’s current level of immigration forces its citizens to bear a large fiscal burden. In theory, this fiscal impact can be calculated (for a given year) by adding the tax dollars paid by immigrants to the immigration surplus and subtracting the cost of government services doled out to immigrants. In practice, however, computing this value is an empirical nightmare. Not only are there more than 11 million undocumented residents currently in America, but it is virtually impossible to accurately gauge the effects of immigration upon social services other than education and welfare, such as the cost incurred by the government to maintain roads, police protection and so forth.⁸² And even within the realm of education and welfare, differentiating the fiscal price tag resulting from immigrants and natives is no easy task. Like estimates of immigration’s distributional effects, figures vary widely between studies. While some argue that immigrants pay as much as $25 to $30 billion more in taxes than they receive from the government, others blame immigrants for a fiscal burden of more than $40 billion.⁸³ As Teresa Hayter notes:

Most research concludes that the effect of immigration on public finances is slight. Seventeen studies on the matter were examined by the OECD in a 1997 report on Trends in International Migration; 4 said the effect of immigration on public finances was zero or positive, 6 that it was zero or negative, and 7 could not decide; none of them was said to be conclusive.⁸⁴

Much like in the debate over immigration’s distributive consequences, economists have yet to achieve a consensus on the net macroeconomic impact of immigration.

Even though theory remains confounded by the empirical studies of economists, at least in America, there is increasing demand for unskilled labor. America faces a shrinking number of unskilled workers, a rising tide of well-educated native workers, and a whole generation of baby boomers which will soon retire. Between 2002 and 2012, the American economy is expected to create approximately 56 million new jobs, half of which will require little more than a high school education; and in that same period, 75 million baby boomers will stop working.⁸⁵ “Arguably the most important statistic for anyone seeking to understand the immigration issue is this: in 1960, half of all American men dropped out of high school to look for unskilled work, whereas less than ten percent do so now.”⁸⁶ With less and less American citizens to fill the ranks of the construction and restaurant industries, and an increasing number choosing education over menial jobs during their late teens and early twenties, our future unskilled workforce must come from abroad. This is a simple argument about supply and demand. The estimated shortfall of unskilled labor is expected to run into the hundreds of thousands per year.⁸⁷ If Americans plan on continuing to enjoy the fruits of their wealth, then a policy that permits unskilled laborers entry into the country is of necessity, regardless whether those workers come from Mexico, Europe or elsewhere.

Besides simply filling labor market vacancies resulting from domestic supply deficits, immigrants can benefit the economy in other ways as well. Ottaviano and Peri show in their study of U.S. metropolitan areas that the human capital differences between immigrants and American citizens, even when seemingly slight, can have non-trivial, positive economic consequences.⁸⁸ Since immigrants possess different types of skills–educational achievements, work experiences, language abilities and cultural heritages–they act as imperfect substitutes for American workers, even within specific occupational cohorts. Similar to how the production of goods benefits from a variety of factors, a variety of skills in the labor force can serve as a mechanism for mutual learning and advancement. In this fashion, as a proverbial melting pot of peoples tackle issues from various perspectives, business ideas and processes can be reworked and improved.

On another note, one reason immigrants may not displace domestic workers is that they typically accept jobs that native laborers shun or that have come to be viewed as suitable only for foreigners.⁸⁹ Oftentimes, these occupations are viewed domestically as “unfit” for the native labor force because the mere utterance of such job titles implicitly labels their constituents as members of the lower class. Douglas Massey explains, “Since there always has to be a bottom of any hierarchy, motivational problems are inevitable. What employers need are workers who view bottom-level jobs simply as a means to the end of earning money and for whom employment is reduced solely to a matter of income, with no implication for status or prestige.”⁹⁰ As we will come to see more clearly in the next section of this chapter, the motivation to migrate across international borders most often arises from exigent circumstances that in turn stimulate a desire to access capital. This notion not only belies the traditional assumption that migrants generally yearn to permanently transplant their lives and their families, but it also indicates that unlike native workers, many migrant laborers will pay little attention to the social status attached to a particular occupation. And by answering demand cues in markets that have been ignored by the domestic labor force, foreign workers will allow the receiving nation’s economy to expand and function more efficiently.

Within this economic discussion, the focus has been on the results of a domestic cost-benefit analysis that seemingly operates in a vacuum, unhindered by the interests of foreigners. As the first section of this chapter resoundingly concludes, the use of such a narrow analytical lens for public policy would represent nothing short of a contravention of global distributive justice–a failure of governments and peoples to understand the import of “The Golden Rule.” If we are to pursue a sense of justice as fairness, then an equal consideration of interests must occur under stipulations imposed by the original position, not preconditions where people’s placement within the international community is already known. This is not to argue that the interests of immigrants should be considered on a similar plane of importance as those of citizens. Through the use of a “realistic utopia,” we realize that Rawlsian ideal theory is constrained by the nation-state system present in our world today. The concept of the self-determining state is derived as much from theories of global justice as from practical realities of the international order. Given this order, if a government were to look after the interests of foreigners to a similar extent as those of citizens, it would most likely impair the domestic economy and jeopardize national security. In other words, although we live in a “globalized” world, global politics are defined by sovereign states working in tandem with international institutions, not a unified international government. As a result, for a given state to run effectively and efficiently, for the purposes of domestic governance, not all people’s interests are considered to be similarly important.

But simply because the attachment of equal value to the interests of citizens and foreigners results in unacceptable consequences for a nation’s economy and security does not denote that foreigners are irrelevant to the process of policy formation. While, at least within the context of public policy, the interests of foreigners should not possess equal importance as those of citizens, as derived from the original position, prospective immigrants’ desires still carry considerable weight. Ultimately, positive citizenship rights conferred by birth are “arbitrary from a moral point of view.” With regard to this fact, a cost-benefit analysis based solely upon domestic economic factors is not sufficient defense for public policy suggestions. Since the moral argument in favor of liberal immigration regimes stems from conditions that are inherently fair, even if economic theory and empiricism find immigration to present a net fiscal burden on a state, liberal immigration policies could still conceivably be defended. After all, in America we do not throw the handicapped out on the street simply because providing them reasonable public accommodation imposes a de facto tax on all citizens. Rather, we should appreciate our advantages in life, especially those which we did nothing to earn, and thus always act with reflection upon the ethic of reciprocity.

The Interests of Foreigners–Economic Development and International Migration

Finally, before immigration policy issues can be properly analyzed, it is important to understand what transnational migrants hope to achieve through their travels. In particular, what factors fuel the out-migration observable from lesser developed countries (LDCs)? In defense of what has loosely been referred to as the new economics of labor migration (NELM),⁹¹ Douglas Massey has described the causal linkage between economic development and international migration.⁹² As Massey explains, economic development stimulates communal instability, destroying those norms that govern the integrated social and economic systems of pre-industrial society. “The mechanisms of destruction involve three mutually reinforcing processes: the substitution of capital for labor, the privatization and consolidation of landholding, and the creation of markets.”⁹³ As countries industrialize, capital investments become concentrated within cities, allowing companies to benefit from economies of scale. What makes migration occur is not the city itself, but the geographic unevenness of economic development within a developing country and between the developing country and other nations.⁹⁴ Nations enter the developmental process with varying resources, histories, and problems; consequently, large disparities exist between countries in terms of level of industrialization.

Economic development weakens a people’s relationship with their land, displacing them socially as well as economically. The emotional strain produced by the destruction of agrarian society becomes further exacerbated by the missing and failed markets that result during the course of development. Examples that economists have turned their attention to in recent years include “missing credit and insurance markets, high transaction costs in output and input markets, and limited access to information [...].”⁹⁵ Domestically, if unemployment skyrockets or markets fail to properly transfer risks and distribute resources, individuals have an incentive to access capital via international means. Since failed markets make it difficult to secure a livelihood at home, families may encourage one or more of their members to go abroad.⁹⁶ Thus, “contrary to common perceptions, international migration does not stem from a lack of economic development, but from development itself.”⁹⁷

But the fundamental question still remains: why should the U.S. assist LDCs through its immigration policy? The interest-based approach supported by this work views the adoption of liberal immigration regimes as the “imperfect duty” of immigration receiving nations. The main factor inhibiting this imperfect duty from becoming a positive moral obligation lies within the international order–an order characterized by self-determining states. Assuming the completely free movement of people between countries could coexist, to a reasonable degree, with the principle ends of all governments (including robust national security and economic wellbeing), there would seem to be no reason why transnational migration ought to be restricted whatsoever. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Nonetheless, when considering the interests of peoples of LDCs from behind the veil of ignorance, it would only seem right that short of sacrificing important state goals, receiving countries use their legislative power to allow for the transfer of people, and subsequently capital, from one nation to the next. Here, both LDCs and wealthy host countries will likely experience positive macroeconomic benefits.

Beyond the argument that views liberal immigration regimes as an imperfect duty, Thomas Pogge’s refutation of the Purely Domestic Poverty Thesis (PDPT) makes a strong case for regarding restrictionist policy as tantamount to a violation of a positive moral obligation.⁹⁸ The PDPT proposes that poverty, or lack of economic development, is due to domestic factors and not foreign influences. Many societies have arrived at their present social and economic statuses, for better or worse, through the processes of enslavement, colonialism and even genocide.⁹⁹ Although many of these terrible injustices have long ago ended, the legacy they have left is often one of internal social and political strife as well as handicapped economic development. Secondly, as Pogge notes, the global economic order, in concert with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, has played a vital role in shaping international trade and development.¹⁰⁰ The enormously superior political and diplomatic bargaining power of rich countries has resulted in a global economic system that greatly favors developed nations. For example, until the OECD adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions in 1999, rampant corruption hampered the competitiveness of markets in many developing countries. Before this convention became international law, “most developed states did not merely legally authorize their firms to bribe foreign officials, but even allowed them to deduct such bribes from their taxable revenues, thereby providing financial inducements and moral support to the practice of bribing politicians and officials in the poor countries.”¹⁰¹

More importantly, the “resource privilege,” which is respected by international institutions and law, creates perverse incentives for coup attempts and civil wars in LDCs. Whatever group is in control of a country, irrespective of how they attained their positions, possesses the ability to effectuate the legal transfer of resource ownership rights. Thus, a coalition movement can take power by any means necessary, borrow funds against future resource sales, and later export goods to wealthier nations at whatever price it deems fit.¹⁰² And if poor government policy leads to outstanding foreign debt, that debt is rolled over from one political administration to the next. The result for some developing nations is a vicious, downward spiral of increasing political corruption, civil strife, and economic depression.

This rejection of the PDPT may suggest that the notion of immigration as an imperfect duty, even within an international community defined by sovereign states, falls short of its ethical responsibility. All types of moral theories, including ones predicated on deontological and utilitarian principles, teach that when people can improve the situation of the poor at little cost to themselves, they have a moral duty to do so. In this case, these theories become complicated by a conflict between state authority and global distributive justice. Nevertheless, as Pogge comments:

If the global economic order plays a major role in the persistence of severe poverty worldwide and if our governments, acting in our name, are prominently involved in shaping and upholding this order, then the deprivation of the distant needy may well engage not merely positive duties to assist but also more stringent negative duties not to harm.¹⁰³

History and the resulting system of international treaties and conventions have created a global order where developed nations have actively participated in impeding the economic progress of developing countries. Consequently, wealthy nations, as a matter of compensatory justice, owe LDCs a certain amount of social and economic aid.

The causal mechanism that indicates, from a moral and macroeconomic perspective, why wealthy nations ought to establish liberal immigration regimes has now been fully described and deserves repeating. First, since positive citizenship rights are “arbitrary from a moral point of view,” the original position dictates that immigration receiving countries consider the interests of foreigners during the process of policy formation. Yet, state sovereignty, as well as the lack of political feasibility of global governance, forces liberal immigration regimes into the philosophical sphere of imperfect moral duties. As a matter of compensation, and in recognition of the primacy of global distributive justice, wealthy nations have certain positive obligations to aid LDCs. As a result of economic development, Massey shows how out-migration will follow as individuals search abroad for answers to the failed and missing markets at home. For all of their wit, economists have yet to prove that ensuing waves of immigration hold negative distributive consequences for a receiving nation’s labor market. Conversely, qualitative investigation and theoretical analysis show that, similar to free trade in goods, free movement of labor causes beneficial macroeconomic consequences for all nations involved. Therefore, America should not combat these international movements of people with protectionist immigration policies and should instead reflect upon basic economic principles and the larger implications of Rawls’ original position.

Ultimately, whether or not liberal immigration policies fall under the positive moral and compensatory responsibilities of wealthy nations is highly debatable and somewhat inconsequential. In the interest of global distributive justice, however, one thing is for certain–all wealthy nations should provide developmental aid to LDCs. And as Massey explains, “If it is in the interest of the United States to promote rapid economic development in [LDCs], it is also in its interest to accept relatively large numbers [...of] immigrants [from those countries].”¹⁰⁴ Politicians can quibble about how liberal an immigration policy is “liberal enough,” how much aid we owe to various LDCs, and which developed countries ought to provide more aid than others. They can point fingers at nations that fail to answer the calls for assistance, and they can even cite the concepts of “self-determination” and “political sovereignty” in defense of a state’s arguable right to turn a blind eye to the interests of foreigners. In the end, the only countries who will make a difference will reflect upon the ethic of reciprocity and support significantly liberal immigration policies.